Repetition increases false recollection in older people by Pitarque, Alfonso et al.
Development and Aging
Repetition increases false recollection in older people
ALFONSO PITARQUE, ALICIA SALES, JUAN CARLOS MELENDEZ and SALVADOR ALGARABEL
Department of Psychology-Methodology, University of Valencia, Avda Blasco Ibanez, 21, 46010 Valencia, Spain
Pitarque, A., Sales, A., Melendez, J. C. & Algarabel, S. (2015). Repetition increases false recollection in older people. Scandinavian Journal of
Psychology, 56, 38–44.
Aging is accompanied by an increase in false alarms on recognition tasks, and these false alarms increase with repetition in older people (but not in
young people). Traditionally, this increase was thought to be due to a greater use of familiarity in older people, but it was recently pointed out that false
alarms also have a clear recollection component in these people. The main objective of our study is to analyze whether the expected increase in the rate
of false alarms in older people due to stimulus repetition is produced by an inadequate use of familiarity, recollection, or both processes. To do so, we
carried out an associative recognition experiment using pairs of words and pairs of images (faces associated with everyday contexts), in which we ana-
lyzed whether the repetition of some of the pairs increases the rate of false alarms in older people (compared to what was found in a sample of young
people), and whether this increase is due to familiarity or recollection (using a remember-know paradigm). Our results show that the increase in false
alarms in older people due to repetition is produced by false recollection, calling into question both dual and single-process models of recognition. Also,
older people falsely recollect details of never studied stimuli, a clear case of perceptual illusions. These results are better explained in terms of source-
monitoring errors, mediated by people’s retrieval expectations.
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INTRODUCTION
This research analyzes why older people commit more false
alarms (FA) in recognition tasks than young people, as repe-
titions of the stimuli increase (e.g., Buchler, Faunce, Light,
Gottfredson & Reder, 2011; Light, Patterson, Chung & Healy,
2004). A sample of older people and a sample of young people
performed two associative recognition tasks in which we manip-
ulated (within subjects) the type of stimuli (pairs of words or
pairs of images) and the number of presentations of the stimuli
during the study phase (once vs. twice). Remember-know judg-
ments on the recognition responses will allow to analyze and
discuss the nature of these FA.
There is considerable consensus in the literature to accept
that the recognition of an item (or an association of items)
can be based either on consciously eliciting contextual details
associated with that item (recollection) or merely on an auto-
matic sense of familiarity in the absence of contextual details
(familiarity). Recollection is conceived of as a conscious,
attention-demanding process of threshold-type qualitative retrie-
val, while familiarity would be an unconscious and automatic
retrieval process based on the quantitative estimation of the
strength of the memory trace, based on signal detection theory
(SDT). Therefore, these models are known as dual models
(e.g., Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012, for
reviews), which have received considerable experimental sup-
port, even in animal experiments (e.g., Basile & Hampton,
2013). In contrast to the dual models, the single-process or
global strength theories (e.g., Wixted, 2007; Wixted &
Mickes, 2010), propose that information retrieval from the
memory is based only on a quantitative estimation of the trace
strength based on the SDT: what dual models call familiarity
would refer to weak memories, while recollection would refer to
strong memories.
Although there are several experimental procedures to estimate
recollection and familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002, for a review),
the remember-know (RK) procedure (Tulving, 1985) is the most
widely used (Migo, Mayes & Montaldi, 2012). In the RK para-
digm participants are required to report whether they recognize
an item on the basis of recollection of episodic information
about the study event (remembering) or the item is familiar in
the absence of recollection (knowing). Even though the RK pro-
cedure has been criticized for its introspective nature, it is true
that R and K responses produce results that agree with results
from other methods for estimating recollection and familiarity
(e.g., McCabe, Geraci, Boman, Sensenig & Rhodes, 2011; Migo
et al., 2012), thus we consider it can be a suitable method for
the study of the nature of FA.
One trait of human memory is its susceptibility to distortions
and illusions (e.g., Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000, for a
review). On recognition tasks, these memory failures become evi-
dent through the analysis of FA. FA (as well as false memories,
illusions, etc.) are known to increase with age (e.g., McCabe,
Roediger, McDaniel & Balota, 2009; Norman & Schacter, 1997;
Rhodes, Castel & Jacoby, 2008), especially in the case of events
that share perceptual or conceptual characteristics (Norman &
Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Koutstaal & Norman, 1997). This
increase in FA is generally thought to be due to the (incorrect)
use of familiarity to compensate for the episodic deﬁcit that
accompanies age (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Rhodes et al.,
2008). However, in a meta-analytic review using the RK para-
digm, McCabe et al. (2009) recently showed that age-associated
deﬁcits are observed through an increase in false alarms on recol-
lection type judgments, which would indicate that these deﬁcits
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are mainly due to an incorrect recollection of episodic details
associated with other items studied before (source misattribu-
tions), rather than an incorrect use of familiarity (see also
Dodson, Bawa & Krueger, 2007; Gallo & Roediger, 2003;
Norman & Schacter, 1997), which clearly contradicts the theoreti-
cal proposals of the dual models, as it is not possible to recollect
what has not been previously studied.
The associative recognition paradigm is an appropriate tool
for analyzing the role that recollection and familiarity play in
both correct and false recognition, as this procedure produces
higher rates of FA in older people than those obtained using the
item recognition procedure (Rhodes et al., 2008). In the associa-
tive recognition paradigm, the participants study non-related
pairs of stimuli, having to discriminate on the later recognition
task between intact pairs (that is, recognize pairs of stimuli pre-
sented exactly the way they were studied), rearranged pairs (or
pairs of stimuli that both appeared in the study phase, but are
not presented in the same pairs in the recognition phase) or new
pairs (pairs of stimuli not studied before). Using this paradigm,
older people have shown less ability to discriminate between
intact and rearranged pairs than young people, clearly indicating
that they show an associative-binding deﬁcit (Craik & Rose,
2012; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Furthermore, the older
people produced more FA on the rearranged pairs than the
young people did, and this difference increased with the number
of repetitions of the stimuli during the study phase (Buchler
et al., 2011; Light et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2008), which
would indicate that their recognition depends more on familiarity-
based processes when faced with a deﬁcit in recollection. How-
ever, this result contradicts the results from the McCabe et al.
(2009) meta-analysis, which show that the increase in FA in
older people is mainly due to recollection-type judgments and
not to familiarity.
The main objective of our study is to shed light on this con-
tradiction in the literature (that is, to analyze whether the greater
rate of FA that would be expected in elderly people due to stim-
ulus repetition has its origins in recollection or familiarity), using
an associative recognition paradigm with RK judgments. In the
study phase of our experiment, the participants will study pairs
of words or pairs of photographs (faces associated with con-
texts), half of which will be presented only once and the other
half twice. On the later associative recognition task, a third of
the pairs will be intact (half of them studied once, and the other
half twice), a third will be rearranged (half of them studied
once, and the other half twice), and the remaining third will
be new pairs. The participant has to choose one of the these
four response options: a) recognizes the pair as studied before
because he/she remembers details from it (remember or R judg-
ment); b) recognizes the pair presented as studied before because
it is familiar to him/her, but without details (know or K judg-
ment); c) recognizes the pair presented as studied before because
he/she knows that the stimuli appeared before, but are now rear-
ranged; d) recognizes the pair presented as not studied before
because he/she knows the stimuli are new. That is, we applied
the RK associative recognition paradigm in only one step (and
not in two steps as is usually done, following the recommenda-
tions of Migo et al., 2012, trying to avoid the retrospective RK
judgment involved after the ﬁrst yes decision).
The idea of using materials consisting of photographs of faces
associated with natural contexts is not new (e.g., Chen &
Naveh-Benjamin, 2012; Kilb & Naveh-Benjamin, 2011). Various
arguments can be made to justify it: images are said to have
greater ecological validity than verbal materials (Weinstein &
Shanks, 2010); they promote a deeper encoding of the materials
(Craik & Rose, 2012); and, ﬁnally, they are better recalled than
words (picture superiority effect) by both young and older peo-
ple (e.g., Defeyter, Russo & McPartlin, 2009; Paivio, 1971).
Moreover, this effect increases with age (Defeyter et al., 2009).
Likewise, images are known to provoke more FA in healthy
older people than in young people (e.g., Vannuci, Mazzoni,
Marchetti & Lavezzini, 2012), so that they ﬁt the objectives of
the present study perfectly.
Based on the above, we hypothesize that regarding false rec-
ognition, elderly people will commit more FA than the young
people, and the FA will increase with the repetitions, but only
in the group of older people, and not in young people (e.g.,
Buchler et al., 2011). As young people do not show episodic
impairment, they will use the repetitions to improve their strat-
egy of “recall to reject” (e.g., Jones & Jacoby, 2001; Rotello &
Heit, 2000), thus minimizing the rate of FA. However, and this
is the true original objective of our study, we do not know
whether this expected increase in FA in elderly people with
repetitions will be due to recollection errors (such as misattri-
butions, misrecollections, source monitoring errors, etc.; e.g.,
McCabe et al., 2009) or to errors in familiarity (due, for exam-
ple, to the greater activation of the items repeated during the
study; e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Rhodes et al., 2008).
METHOD
Participants
Participants consisted of 28 young adults (Psychology undergraduates at
the University of Valencia; 6 men, 22 women, mean age = 21.46 years,
SD = 4.05 years) and 24 older adults (recruited from a University of
Valencia course for elderly people; 6 men, 18 women, mean age =
66.63 years, SD = 5.24 years). All participants reported being in good
physical and mental health, with no known memory impairments. In this
regard, the mean in the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein,
Folstein & McHugh, 1975) for the older adults was 28.62 (SD = 1.98),
thus showing no memory impairment. The two groups were matched on
gender (v1
2 = 0.09), and they differed on WAIS vocabulary (Wechsler,
2001; t50 = 4.42, p < 0.0001), with the elderly people having more
vocabulary (mean = 10.54, SD = 2.73) than the younger people (mean =
7.64, SD = 1.96), and years of education (t50 = 3.60, p = 0.001, with the
young people having more education than the older people, means of
16.07 and 13.33 years, and SD of 0.93 and 2.91, respectively), which
are a typical pattern of results (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011).
Materials
Word pairs. The materials consisted of 128 Spanish words with between
three and nine letters selected from the Alameda and Cuetos (1995) data-
base. The words had a mean frequency of 50.44 per two million (SD =
108.66), and a mean length of 5.30 letters (SD = 1.01). With these
words, we then created four different lists of 64 pairs of words each, ran-
domly paired: 10 randomly chosen pairs on each list were presented to
the subjects once during the study phase (later making up the intact non-
repeated condition for recognition); another 10 randomly chosen pairs
were presented twice during the study phase (later making up the
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repeated intact condition for recognition); another 10 randomly chosen
pairs were presented once during the study phase (and later made up the
non-repeated rearranged condition for recognition, randomly re-pairing
these stimuli in a different order from the one studied); another randomly
chosen 10 pairs were presented twice during the study phase (making up
the repeated rearranged condition for recognition, randomly re-pairing
these stimuli in a different order from the one studied); another ran-
domly chosen 20 pairs from each list were not presented during the
study phase, but were presented on the recognition task as stimuli in the
new condition. Finally, the four remaining pairs on each list were used
as distractors, with two presented at the beginning and two at the end of
each study task, and not being tested later. These 4 lists were counter-
balanced between subjects; that is, each subject received one of these
lists. Two analyses of variance on the rates of hits and FA produced
by these lists conﬁrmed that there were no signiﬁcant differences
between them on either of these two dependent variables (F < 1, in both
cases).
Picture pairs. The materials consisted of 64 ID-card sized color photo-
graphs (145 9 160 pixels) of anonymous faces (16 of young men, 16 of
young women, 16 of older men and 16 of older women) and 64 color
photographs of unknown everyday scenery (800 9 600 pixels), of which
one-third were open natural scenes (beaches, ﬁelds, etc.), another third
were open urban scenes (streets, building, etc.), and the remaining third
were interiors of building (living rooms, bedrooms, etc.). With these pho-
tographs, we then created four different lists of 64 pairs of photographs
each, putting a randomly chosen face in the center of a randomly chosen
scene, thus setting up the same study and recognition conditions as those
used with the pairs of words. These four lists of images were also coun-
ter-balanced between subjects, and later analyses of the hits and false
alarms produced by these lists conﬁrmed that there were no signiﬁcant
differences between them (F < 1, in both cases).
Procedure
For about 60 minutes, the participants performed two associative
recognition tasks (of pairs of words and pairs of images, counter-
balanced between subjects) separated by a 30-minute period in which
they took the WAIS vocabulary test (Wechsler, 2001) and, only the
older people took the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et al.,
1975).
Each of the associative recognition tasks consisted of a study phase
with pairs of stimuli and a recognition task with these pairs. In the study
phase, 60 pairs of stimuli  2 distractors were presented sequentially
and randomly at the center of a computer screen for 2.5 seconds each
(followed by 1 second delay before the next pair). Of these 60 pairs,
10 pairs were presented once in the subjects’ study phase (later making
up the non-repeated intact recognition condition); 10 pairs were pre-
sented twice during the study phase (later making up the repeated intact
recognition condition); 10 pairs were presented once during the study
phase (later making up the non-repeated rearranged recognition condi-
tion, randomly re-matching these stimuli in a different order from the
one studied); another 10 randomly-chosen pairs were presented twice
during the study phase (making up the repeated rearranged recognition
condition, randomly rearranging these stimuli in a different order from
the one studied). The words were always presented in black 18-point
Courier font on a white background.
In the recognition phase, 60 pairs of stimuli were presented sequen-
tially and randomly at the center of a computer screen, and they re-
mained on the screen until the subject responded to the question about
whether these words or images had appeared together or not in the previ-
ous study task (depending on the recognition task they were doing). To
respond, they had to choose one of these four response options:
1. yes, because I remember some details;
2. yes, because I know that they went together, but not details;
3. no, both stimuli appeared before, but they are rearranged;
4. no, neither stimulus appeared before, they are new.
In other words, participants were asked to respond “old” only to intact
pairs. The text for the response options appeared at the bottom of the
screen, together with the appropriate response key for each option. Of
the 60 pairs of stimuli presented on the recognition task, 10 corre-
sponded to the non-repeated intact condition, 10 corresponded to the
repeated intact condition, 10 corresponded to the non-repeated rear-
ranged condition, 10 corresponded to the repeated rearranged condition,
and 20 corresponded to the new condition. Prior to performing the recog-
nition task, the differences between “remembering” and “knowing” were
explained to subjects using Rajaram’s (1993) instructions, which, in
short, make the distinction between recognition based on retrieving epi-
sodic traces from the items and recognition based on a mere sense of
familiarity without any speciﬁc, episodic information. A practice study
and recognition task was performed to make sure all the subjects under-
stood the instructions, in which each subject had to call out the differ-
ence between remembering and knowing (see Migo et al., 2012).
Design and statistical analysis
We used an experimental design with three independent variables: 2 age
groups (young vs. elderly people; between subjects) 9 2 stimuli (words
vs. pictures; within subjects) 9 3 repetition conditions (non-repeated
pairs, repeated pairs and new stimuli; within subjects). The dependent
variables were the rates of correct answers (hits), FA, and the non-
parametric sensitivity index (A0). The data were analyzed by means of
analysis of variance. The signiﬁcance level for all statistical tests was
p < 0.05.
RESULTS
General recognition performance
We began by analyzing the global recognition data (shown in
Table 1). With regard to hits (hits in remember judgments + hits
in know judgments), a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) of
2 age groups (young vs. elderly people; between subjects) 9 2
stimuli (words vs. pictures; within subjects) 9 2 repetition con-
ditions (non-repeated vs. repeated stimuli; within subjects)
showed that the main effects of the three variables were signiﬁ-
cant: groups (F1,50 = 27.22, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.35), stimuli
(F1,50 = 11.87, p = 0.001, g
2
p = 0.19), and repetition conditions
(F1,50 = 95.13, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.66), indicating that young
people hit more than elderly people (means of 0.82 and 0.64,
respectively), pictures were better recognized than words (means
of 0.78 and 0.68, respectively), and repeated stimuli were better
recognized than unrepeated stimuli (means of 0.82 and 0.64,
respectively). These results coincide with those found in the
literature reviewed in the Introduction, and they support our
procedure. Moreover, the stimuli 9 groups interaction was also
signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 5.65, p = 0.02, g
2
p = 0.10), indicating that
the difference between pictures and words was greater in older
people (means 0.73 and 0.55, respectively) than in young people
(means 0.84 and 0.81, respectively), and supporting the idea that
images are more appropriate for older people than verbal mate-
rial (e.g., Defeyter et al., 2009).
Regarding false alarms (FA in remember judgments + FA in
know judgments; see Table 1), a mixed ANOVA of 2 groups 9
2 stimuli 9 3 repetition conditions (non-repeated, repeated and
new stimuli; within subjects) showed signiﬁcant main effects for
both the groups variable (F1,50 = 48.30, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.49),
indicating that elderly people committed more FA than young
people (means of 0.22 and 0.07, respectively), and the repetition
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conditions variable (F2,100 = 52.36, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.51).
Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests on this latter variable showed all the
differences across the three means to be signiﬁcant: 0.18 for un-
repeated pairs, 0.23 for repeated pairs, and 0.03 for the new
pairs. Moreover, the repetition conditions 9 groups interaction
was also signiﬁcant (F2,100 = 13.54, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.21).
Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests on this interaction showed that repeti-
tion increased the FA rates in older people (means of 0.25 and
0.36 for non-repeated and repeated pairs, respectively), but not
in young people (means of 0.10 and 0.10 for non-repeated and
repeated pairs, respectively), and older people made more FA on
new pairs than young people did (means of 0.06, and 0.00,
respectively). This signiﬁcant interaction conﬁrms the effect we
wanted to elicit (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Light et al., 2004;
Rhodes et al., 2008), and allows us to determine (by analyzing
later the remember and know judgments) whether this effect is
due to an incorrect use of familiarity, recollection, or both pro-
cesses, the main goal of this study.
Finally, we calculated the memory index using the non-
parametric sensitivity (A0) statistic (e.g., Snodgrass and Corwin,
1988). A mixed ANOVA 2 groups 9 2 stimuli 9 2 repetition
conditions (see Table 1) on A0 showed that the main effect of
the groups variable was signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 63.23, p < 0.0001,
g2p = 0.56), indicating that young people performed better than
elderly people (means of 0.92 and 0.77, respectively), as was the
main effect of the repetition conditions variable (F1,50 = 8.54,
p = 0.005, g2p = 0.15), indicating that repeated stimuli were bet-
ter recognized than unrepeated stimuli (means of 0.86 and 0.82,
respectively), while the stimuli variable was marginally signiﬁ-
cant (F1,50 = 3.85, p = 0.055, g
2
p = 0.07, means of 0.86 and
0.82, for pictures and words, respectively). There were no sig-
niﬁcant interactions.
Remember responses
Second, we analyzed the remember (R) responses (see
Table 2). With regard to hits, a mixed ANOVA of 2 groups 9 2
stimuli 9 2 repetition conditions showed that the main effects
of the three variables were signiﬁcant: groups (F1,50 = 19.86,
p < 0.0001, g2p = 0.28), stimuli (F1,50 = 4.64, p < 0.05, g
2
p =
0.09), and the repetition conditions (F1,50 = 88.21, p < 0.0001,
g2p = 0.64), indicating that young people made more R hits
than elderly people (means of 0.69 and 0.45, respectively), pic-
tures were better recognized by R judgments than words (means
of 0.60 and 0.53, respectively), and repeated stimuli were better
recognized by R responses than non-repeated stimuli (means of
0.67 and 0.47, respectively). No interactions were signiﬁcant.
These results coincide with those found in the literature, again
supporting our procedure.
Regarding the FA on R responses (see Table 2), a mixed
ANOVA of 2 groups 9 2 stimuli 9 3 repetition conditions
(non-repeated, repeated and new) showed the main effect of the
groups variable to be signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 45.09, p < 0.0001,
g2p = 0.47, indicating that elderly people made more FA on R
judgments than young people: means of 0.13 and 0.02, respec-
tively), as was the main effect of the repetition conditions (F2,100 =
26.40, p < 0.0001, g2p = 0.35). Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests on
this latter variable showed the difference between the new pairs
vs. non-repeated pairs to be signiﬁcant (means of 0.02 and 0.09,
respectively), as well as the difference between the new pairs vs.
Table 1. Means (and SD) of hits, false alarms, and sensitivity index of
the global results of the associative recognition tasks as a function of
age groups, stimuli, and repetition conditions. Signiﬁcant differences
between age groups (p < 0.05) marked with *
Older (n = 24) Young (n = 28)
Hits Words Non rep 0.45 (0.24) 0.71 (0.22)*
Rep 0.65 (0.24) 0.90 (0.15)*
Pictures Non rep 0.64 (0.17) 0.77 (0.16)*
Rep 0.81 (0.18) 0.91 (0.11)*
False alarms Words Non rep 0.21 (0.19) 0.09 (0.12)*
Rep 0.35 (0.23) 0.11 (0.17)*
New 0.06 (0.08) 0.01 (0.02)*
Pictures Non rep 0.28 (0.23) 0.12 (0.09)*
Rep 0.36 (0.23) 0.09 (0.13)*
New 0.06 (0.11) 0.00 (0.01)*
Sensitivity (A0) Words Non rep 0.73 (0.13) 0.88 (0.11)*
Rep 0.75 (0.13) 0.93 (0.11)*
Pictures Non rep 0.77 (0.12) 0.89 (0.07)*
Rep 0.81 (0.13) 0.95 (0.04)*
Table 2. Means (and SD) of hits, false alarms, and sensitivity index of
the results of the associative recognition tasks broken down into remem-
ber and know judgments as a function of age groups, stimuli, and repeti-
tion conditions. Signiﬁcant differences between age groups (p < 0.05)
marked with *
Older (n = 24) Young (n = 28)
Remember responses
Hits Words Non rep 0.31 (0.27) 0.56 (0.27)*
Rep 0.48 (0.32) 0.78 (0.23)*
Pictures Non rep 0.40 (0.25) 0.59 (0.19)*
Rep 0.60 (0.28) 0.82 (0.18)*
False alarms Words Non rep 0.12 (0.15) 0.03 (0.05)*
Rep 0.22 (0.20) 0.02 (0.08)*
New 0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00)*
Pictures Non rep 0.16 (0.15) 0.04 (0.06)*
Rep 0.21 (0.21) 0.03 (0.05)*
New 0.03 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00)*
Sensitivity (A0) Words Non rep 0.71 (0.16) 0.86 (0.11)*
Rep 0.74 (0.15) 0.93 (0.09)*
Pictures Non rep 0.74 (0.13) 0.88 (0.06)*
Rep 0.79 (0.14) 0.94 (0.05)*
Know responses
Hits Words Non rep 0.14 (0.16) 0.15 (0.14)
Rep 0.18 (0.22) 0.12 (0.14)
Pictures Non rep 0.24 (0.21) 0.18 (0.18)
Rep 0.21 (0.25) 0.10 (0.11)
False alarms Words Non rep 0.09 (0.13) 0.06 (0.09)
Rep 0.13 (0.13) 0.09 (0.11)
New 0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02)
Pictures Non rep 0.13 (0.14) 0.08 (0.08)
Rep 0.15 (0.16) 0.06 (0.10)*
New 0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00)*
Sensitivity (A0) Words Non rep 0.68 (0.14) 0.69 (0.13)
Rep 0.69 (0.12) 0.63 (0.14)
Pictures Non rep 0.68 (0.13) 0.66 (0.14)
Rep 0.65 (0.13) 0.65 (0.14)
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repeated pairs (means of 0.02 and 0.12, respectively), while the
difference between repeated and non-repeated pairs was not sig-
niﬁcant. The interaction groups 9 repetition conditions was also
signiﬁcant (F2,100 = 14.61, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.23). Post hoc
Bonferroni t-tests on this interaction showed that repetition
increases the R false alarm rates in elderly people (means of
0.14 and 0.22, for non-repeated and repeated pairs, respectively),
but not in younger people (means of 0.03 and 0.03, for non-
repeated and repeated pairs, respectively), and elderly people
made more R false alarms on new pairs than young people did
(means of 0.03, and 0.00, respectively). This signiﬁcant interac-
tion clearly conﬁrms that the increase in FA produced by repeti-
tion in older people is due to the incorrect use of recollection,
shedding light on the main hypothesis of our study. Below, in
the analysis of FA on know judgments, we will analyze whether
or not familiarity has a role to play in explaining this effect.
Finally, with regard to the A0 of the R responses (see
Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 2 groups 9 2 stimuli 9 2 repeti-
tion conditions showed the main effect of the groups variable to
be signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 48.71, p < 0.0001, g
2
p = 0.49, indicating
that young people performed better than elderly people on R
responses: means of 0.91 and 0.74, respectively), and the repeti-
tion conditions variable also showed signiﬁcant effect (F1,50 =
22.27, p < 0.0001, g2p = 0.31, indicating that repeated stimuli
were better recognized by R responses than non-repeated stimuli:
means of 0.85 and 0.80, respectively). The stimuli variable was
marginally signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 3.47, p < 0.07, g
2
p = 0.07, indi-
cating a tendency toward a better performance on images than
on words: means of 0.84 and 0.81, respectively).
Know responses
Third, we analyzed the know (K) responses (see Table 2). With
regard to hits, a mixed ANOVA of 2 age groups 9 2 stimuli 9
2 repetition conditions showed the main effects and interactions
of these three variables to be non-signiﬁcant, which means that
older and young people use familiarity in a similar way.
Regarding the FA on K judgments (see Table 2), a mixed
ANOVA of 2 groups 9 2 stimuli 9 3 repetition conditions
(non-repeated, repeated and new) showed that the main effect of
the groups variable was signiﬁcant (F1,50 = 8.97, p = 0.004,
g2p = 0.15, indicating that elderly people made more FA on K
than young people: means of 0.09 and 0.05, respectively), and
the repetition conditions variable was also signiﬁcant (F2,100 =
22.99, p = 0.0001, g2p = 0.32). Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests on
this variable showed that the differences between the new pairs
vs. non-repeated pairs were signiﬁcant (means of 0.02 and 0.09,
respectively), as were the differences between the new pairs vs.
repeated pairs (means of 0.02 and 0.11, respectively), while the
difference between repeated and non-repeated pairs was not sig-
niﬁcant. No interactions were signiﬁcant, which, in relation to
the main objective of our study, means that the increase in false
alarms produced by the repetitions in elderly people is due to
the incorrect use of recollection, and not familiarity, with impli-
cations that we discuss below.
Finally, with regard to the A0 of the K responses (see
Table 2), a mixed ANOVA of 2 groups 9 2 stimuli 9 2 condi-
tions showed that neither the main effects nor the interactions of
these three variables were signiﬁcant. However, comparisons of
the A0 means of the young people (0.66) and elderly people
(0.68) with the value 0.50 (which represents the performance at
chance level) were both signiﬁcant (t27 = 9.40, p < 0.0001, and
t23 = 9.36, p < 0.0001, respectively), indicating that both popula-
tions use K responses efﬁciently and in a similar way to improve
their performance, which seems to support the idea that familiar-
ity does not decline with age.
DISCUSSION
As far as correct recognition is concerned, our results coincide
with those obtained by other laboratories, conﬁrming the appro-
priateness of our procedure. That is, young people recognize bet-
ter than older people because the latter have more difﬁculties in
encoding and remembering the contextual information associated
with an item (conﬁrming the associative-binding deﬁcit hypothe-
sis; e.g., Craik & Rose, 2012; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008),
while both samples use familiarity in a similar and effective way
in recognition. On the other hand, the repetition of the pairs
improves recognition in a similar way in both samples, which
indicates that older people beneﬁt from associative strengthening
as much as young adults do. In other words, the repetition of a
pair increases both the individual activation of the items
involved and the strengthening of the association between them
(e.g., Buchler et al., 2011), which proportionally improves its
future retrieval in both young people and older people. However,
the starting point for older people is lower, due to their afore-
mentioned associative impairment. Finally, images tend to be
recognized better than words in both samples (conﬁrming the
picture superiority effect; e.g., Defeyter et al., 2009), but this
difference is signiﬁcantly greater in older people than in young
people, which experimentally supports using images as mne-
monic aids in the elderly population and in people with cogni-
tive impairment (e.g., Ally, Gold & Budson, 2009).
Regarding false recognition, our results show that the older
people systematically made more FA than the young people,
both on pairs of stimuli studied before but rearranged (e.g.,
Buchler et al., 2011; Light et al., 2004) and on new pairs of
stimuli not studied before (illusions). Moreover, repetition does
not increase false alarms in young people (conﬁrming the idea
that they correctly use a mechanism of recall-to-reject; e.g.,
Jones & Jacoby, 2001; Rotello & Heit, 2000), but it does
increase them in older people. The traditional explanation for
this difference is that older people use familiarity more than
young people do (e.g., Buchler et al., 2011; Rhodes et al.,
2008). However, and this is the novel result from our investiga-
tion, our results show that the origin of this increase lies in rec-
ollection, and not in familiarity. Applied to everyday life, our
results would indicate that for both young and older people, see-
ing a person various times in the same context increases the
future probability of correctly remembering the context in which
they met this person. However, for older people (but not young
people), seeing the same person several times in the same con-
text also increases the probability of incorrectly remembering
that they met this person in another similar but different context
(which could have serious implications in eyewitness testimo-
nies, for example). This ironic effect (Jacoby, 1999) seems to
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occur in situations that share similar perceptual and/or concep-
tual characteristics (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al.,
1997), as occurs in our experiment.
With regard to the result that older people regularly commit
more FA on new stimuli (illusions) than young people, this has
been considered by some authors (e.g., Abe, Fujii, Nishio et al.,
2011; Hildebrandt et al., 2009a, 2009b) as an obvious symptom
of cognitive impairment. Furthermore false recollections tend to
increase proportionally to the degree of cognitive impairment
(e.g., in patients with mild cognitive impairment, or Alzheimer
disease).
Overall, these results cast doubts on the dual models of recog-
nition, which are not able to explain how we can recollect some-
thing that we never studied (e.g., McCabe et al., 2009). In
theory, we might think that our results ﬁt the theoretical propos-
als of single-process models better, as they would predict that
repetition would increase the strength of the items’ trace, which
would make them easier to recollect, provoking more correct
recognitions as well as more incorrect ones (e.g., Tussing &
Greene, 2001). However, at the same time, these models cannot
explain why older people make more R false alarms than young
people on new pairs of stimuli, as the trace strength of both
stimuli is the same (in theory null) in both groups.
Our results seem to be more easily explained from the models
related to the false memories’ literature, supporting the idea that
false remembering in older people seems be the result of both
encoding difﬁculties and source misattributions at retrieval: what
seems to occur in older people when they process stimuli that
share perceptual and conceptual characteristics is that, ﬁrst, they
encode the stimuli through weaker episodic traces than young peo-
ple, miscombining features from studied events (e.g., Treisman &
Schmidt, 1982), due to their deﬁcits in attention or executive con-
trol (associative-binding deﬁcit hypothesis), and second, their
retrieval can be affected by their own expectations or intuitions
about what might have happened in the past, which can produce
misrecollections or source monitoring errors. For example the acti-
vation/monitoring framework (e.g., Gallo, 2010, 2013; McDermott
& Watson, 2001; Roediger, Watson, McDermott & Gallo, 2001)
supports the idea that false recognition can be the result of either
the automatic activation of lures at encoding (or at retrieval), or
source monitoring errors committed at retrieval (guided by our
expectations in memory decisions; see also Fandakova, Shing &
Lindenberger, 2013; Johnson, 2006). Thereby, true and false
memories would consist of reconstructions of what happened, aris-
ing false memories from the same source monitoring processes
that produce true memories (which means that one can never be
absolutely sure of the truth of any particular memory; Johnson,
2006). This theoretical framework could ﬁt our results, in the sense
that it could easily explain why older people committed more
remember FA than young people, both in rearranged and in new
pairs, and why older and young people do not differ in know FA,
because they used activation in a similar way.
The activation/monitoring models explain the cause of these
misrecollections in older people by an age-associated decline in
the medial temporal lobe structures (hippocampus, perirhinal and
parahippocampal cortices) and prefrontal cortex, which are very
important for episodic binding and/or retrieval (e.g., Gallo, 2013;
Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Other authors (e.g., Hildebrandt
et al., 2009a, 2009b; Romberg, McTighe, Heath et al., 2012)
suggest that false memories could be due to the accumulation of
plaques of the beta amyloid protein implicated in Alzheimer’s
disease (and in its prodromal condition, mild cognitive impair-
ment) which leads to aberrant synaptic plasticity, thus increasing
the likelihood of false recognition. As these plaques of the beta
amyloid protein can be also found (by post-mortem autopsies) in
the brains of some older healthy persons without dementia (e.g.,
Bennett, Schneider, Arvanitakis et al., 2006), this hypothesis
could also explain why these people show false recollections.
Thus, future research should combine behavioral experiments
with neuroimaging and behavioral genetic measures to explain
why people differ at encoding and recovering true and false
information from their memory.
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